El Correo

Les Etats-Unis auraient pu éviter le meurtre d'Orlando Letelier. Letelier - Moffitt assassination 30 years later

2006-09-25T12:45:13Z

The National Security Archive.
Washington, le 20 septembre 2006.

English down this page

Pour le 30ème anniversaire du meurtre de l'ex-ambassadeur chilien aux Etats-Unis Orlando Letelier et sa collègue étasunienne Ronni Karpen Moffitt, les Archives de Sécurité Nationale de l'Université George Washington a demandé ce mercredi au gouvernement des Etats-Unis de déclassifier tous les documents sur la participation du général Auguste Pinochet dans l'explosion de la voiture de Letelier le 21 septembre 1976, un des plus retentissants actes de terrorisme qui a eu lieu dans la capitale étasunienne.

Selon Peter Kornbluh, directeur du Projet de Documentation sur le Chili des Archives, "dans l'actuel contexte de la guerre de l'administration américaine contre le terrorisme international, il est important de savoir l'histoire complète des faibles efforts des Etats-Unis pour détecter et dissuader un plan terroriste qui a eu lieu au cœur de Washington, D.C., en 1976".

Des centaines de documents qui impliquent Pinochet pour autoriser et couvrir des crimes pendant l'Opération Condor, ont été déclassifiés pendant l'administration Clinton, mais ont été gelé dans les années 2000 parce qu'elles pourraient servir hypothétiquement de preuves pour une enquête ouverte par le Département de la Justice sur le dictateur Chilien.

Les Archives, une institution académique indépendante, ont dévoilé ce mercredi une note envoyée le 8 octobre 1976 [1] au Secrétaire de État Henry Kissinger, qui fait le compte rendu du rapprochement de la CIA au chef de la police secrète chilien (DINA), Manuel Contreras, pour faire des recherches sur la participation à l'Opération Condor dans l'attentat terroriste du 21 septembre 1976 contre l'ex- ambassadeur chilien, dont les auteurs physiques ont été des anticommunistes cubains sous les ordres de la DINA.

La note secrète a été écrite par le représentant de Kissinger pour l'Amérique latine, Harry Schlaudeman, et on y affirme que Contreras avait nié que "l'Opération Condor ait tout autre but que l'échange d'Intelligence."

Bien que l'attentat ait eu lieu quelques jours avant au centre de Washington DC, la note ne fait aucune référence sur les liens de Contreras avec les meurtriers Letelier et de Moffit, "même si l'administration des Etats-Unis disposait des preuves suffisantes que la DINA chilienne était l'auteur la plus probable du crime", affirme Kornbluh. En 1978, Contreras a été jugé par un tribunal des Etats-Unis pour avoir dirigé l'attaque terroriste.

Parmi les mémorandums dirigés à Kissinger, publiés par les Archives, on trouve une série de documents [2] qui font la lumière sur ce que savait le gouvernement des Etats-Unis sur l'Opération Condor - la collaboration des services secrets de la police du Cône Sud pour enlever, torturer, et assassiner des adversaires durant les années 70, avec l'approbation de Washington - et quelles actions il a mené ou il n'a pas pu mené avant le meurtre Letelier - Moffitt.

Selon Kornbluh, le 23 août 1976 le bureau de Kissinger a envoyé une plainte diplomatique (demarche) [3], soigneusement rédigée, aux ambassadeurs des Etats-Unis au Chili, Argentine, Bolivie, Uruguay et Paraguay, pour la livrer aux gouvernements respectifs, dans laquelle on parle de la connotation publique des meurtres qui se produisaient dans ces pays. Mais le jour suivant, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis au Chili, David Popper [4] a répondu qu'il n'allait pas donner la note à Pinochet parce qu' "il peut prendre comme une insulte toute référence qui le lie avec de telles stratégies pour ce type de meurtre". À sa place, Popper a sollicité une autorisation pour l'envoyer au chef du bureau de la CIA au Chili pour converser de cela avec Contreras. Pour des raisons encore ignorées à cause de documents toujours classés, Schlaudeman n'a pas autorisé ce rapprochement jusqu'au 4 octobre, deux semaines après l'attentat contre la voiture de Letelier à Washington.

Pour des raisons aussi "inconnues", le 20 septembre 1976, un jour avant le meurtre de Letelier et Moffitt, Schlaudeman [5]a ordonné à son propre représentant de dire aux ambassadeurs du Cône Sud "de ne pas organiser aucune autre action" - c'est-à-dire, de les critiquer pour les meurtres -, parce que "il n'y a pas eu de rapports dans les dernières semaines qui indiquent l'intention d'activer l'Opération Condor." Dans sa note du 8 octobre à Kissinger [6], relative au mémorandum de la CIA sur la conversation avec Contreras, Schlaudeman il assurait que "le rapprochement avec Contreras me paraît suffisant pour le moment, "parce que "les Chiliens sont le moteur de Condor."

Les archives ont aussi déclassifié une seconde note de Schlaudeman à Kissinger [7] qui rend compte d'un câble de l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis en Uruguay Ernest Siracusa, où il exprime ses préoccupations sur la tournure terroriste qu'a prise l'Opération Condor. Dans sa note à Kissinger en date du 30 août 1976 [8], Schlaudeman donne à comprendre qu'il connaît parfaitement les plans de l'Opération et assure que : "Nous essayons d'éviter une série de meurtres internationaux qui pourraient faire des dommages sérieux à la réputation des pays impliqués."

Kornbluh juge qu'il est évident que les Etats-Unis en effet avaient des signaux sur les plans de meurtres de l'Opération Condor, où le Chili "était le moteur impulsif", et que ceux-ci apparaissent dans le mémorandum de la CIA qui renvoie la conversation avec Contreras et le câble de Siracusa, documents qui restent censurés par l'actuelle administration des Etats-Unis.

Documents (en Anglais)

Action Mémorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, "Operation Condor," August 30,1976 [9]
Source : Freedom of Information Act request.

[Briefing Mémorandum, Ambassador Harry Schlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, "Operation Condor," October 8,.1976 [10]
Source : Freedom of Information Act request.

Traduction pour El Correo : Estelle et Carlos Debiasi.

LETELIER-MOFFITT ASSASSINATION
30 YEARS LATER

National Security Archive calls for Release of Withheld Documents Relating to Pinochet's Role in Infamous Act of Terrorism in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1976

Archive releases new document on CIA approach to Manuel Contreras on Operation Condor

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 199
Posted - September 20, 2006
For more information contact :
Peter Kornbluh
202/374-7281
peter.kornbluh@gmail.com

Washington, DC, September 20, 2006 - On the thirtieth anniversary of the assassination of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt, the National Security Archive today called on the U.S. government to release all documents relating to the role of General Augusto Pinochet in the car bombing that brought terrorism to the capital city of the United States on September 21, 1976.

Hundreds of documents implicating Pinochet in authorizing and covering up the crime were due to be declassified under the Clinton administration but were withheld in the spring of 2000 as evidence for a Justice Department investigation into the retired dictator's role. After more than six years, according to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Chile Documentation Project, it is time to release them. "If there is not going to be a legal indictment," Kornbluh said, "the documents can and will provide an indictment of history."

The Archive today released a declassified memo to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger [11] reporting on a CIA approach in early October 1976 to the head of the Chilean secret police, Manuel Contreras, regarding U.S. concerns about Operation Condor assassination plots. The secret memo, written by Kissinger's deputy for Latin America, Harry Shlaudeman, noted that Contreras had denied that "Operation Condor has any other purpose than the exchange of intelligence." While the car bombing in downtown Washington, D.C. that killed Letelier and Moffitt took place on September 21, 1976, the memo contains no reference to any discussion with Contreras about the assassinations—even though DINA was widely considered to be the most likely perpetrator of the crime. In 1978, Contreras was indicted by a U.S. Grand Jury for directing the terrorist attack.

The document was obtained by Kornbluh under the Freedom of Information Act.

The memorandum to Kissinger adds to a series of documents [12] that have been obtained by the National Security Archive that shed light on what the U.S. government knew about Operation Condor—a collaboration of Southern Cone secret police services to track down, abduct, torture, and assassinate opponents in the mid and late 1970s—and what actions it took or failed to take prior to the Letelier-Moffitt assassination. On August 23, 1976, Kissinger's office sent a carefully-worded demarche [13] for U.S. ambassadors in Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay to deliver to their host governments to halt assassination missions. But the next day, [14] U.S. Ambassador to Chile David Popper balked at approaching Pinochet because "he might take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots." Instead Popper requested permission to send the CIA station chief to talk to Contreras. For reasons that remain hidden in still-classified documents, Shlaudeman did not authorize that approach until October 4, two weeks after the car bombing in Washington.

Indeed, on September 20, 1976, the day before the Letelier-Moffitt assassination, Shlaudeman ordered [15] his own deputy to tell the Southern Cone ambassadors "to take no further action" on pressuring the Condor nations to halt assassination plotting, because "there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme." In his October 8 memo to Kissinger [16] transmitting the CIA memorandum of conversation with Col. Contreras, Shlaudeman argued that "the approach to Contreras seems to me to be sufficient action for the time being" because "the Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor."

The Archive also released a second memo from Shlaudeman to Kissinger [17] reporting on a cable from U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay Ernest Siracusa voicing his concerns on presenting the Condor demarche. Siracusa, the memo suggests, feared that he would become a target of Operation Condor if he followed his diplomatic instructions, and recommended that Shlaudeman approach Uruguay's ambassador to Washington instead. In his memo to Kissinger dated August 30, 1976 [18], Shlaudeman spelled out the U.S. position on Condor assassination plots : "What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved."

Kornbluh noted that neither the CIA memorandum of conversation with Contreras nor the Sircusa cable has been declassified and urged the Bush administration to release all records relating to Operation Condor and the Letelier-Moffitt case. "Amidst today's ongoing effort against international terrorism," he noted, "it is important to know the full history of the failure of U.S. efforts to detect and deter a terrorist plot in the heart of Washington, D.C."

Documents

[Action Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, "Operation Condor," August 30, 1976 [19]
Source : Freedom of Information Act request.

[Briefing Memorandum, Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman to Secretary Kissinger, "Operation Condor," October 8, 1976 [20]
Source : Freedom of Information Act request.

[1] Voir :

[2] http://www.gwu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB...

[3] Voir :

[4] Voir :

[5] Voir :

[6] Voir :

[7] Voir :

[8] Voir :

[9] Voir :

[10] Voir :

[11] -

[12] http://www.gwu.edu/ nsarchiv/NSAEBB...

[13] -

[14] -

[15] -

[16] -

[17] -

[18] -

[19] -

[20] -

Notes :

Arrestation du général Contreras au Chili

2005-01-28T17:34:02Z

L'ex-chef de la police secrète du général Pinochet, le général Manuel Contreras, a été arrêté vendredi 28 janvier à son domicile de Santiago, au terme d'une opération de police mouvementée.

Contreras avait refusé de se rendre devant le tribunal qui devait lui signifier vendredi sa condamnation à 12 ans de prison pour la disparition, en 1975, d'un jeune militant de gauche, Miguel Angel Sandoval. Quatre autres responsables militaires de l'ancienne DINA, Marcelo Moren Brito, Miguel Krassnoff, Fernando Laureani et Gerardo Godoy, ont été arrêtés ce même jour pour cette disparition.

Les cinq militaires en retraite avaient été condamnés l'année dernière, mais plusieurs procédures avaient retardé l'exécution du jugement jusqu'à aujourd'hui

Assassinat du Général Carlos Prats

2005-01-23T18:49:12Z

Attentat à Buenos Aires, Argentine.

En 1974, dans le cadre de l'Opération Condor, a eu lieu la mort du général Carlos Prats et de son épouse, Sofia Cuthbert, qui ont été victimes d'un attentat à Buenos Aires.

À 00.50 hrs. Le 30 septembre, le général Carlos Prats revenait d'un dîner chez Ramón Huidobro, ex ambassadeur du Chili en Argentine. Accompagné de son épouset, avec laquelle il partageait 30 ans de mariage et avait trois filles, il est arrivé à son domicile dans le quartier chic de Palerme à Buenos Aires. En descendant de sa voiture et après un échange nourri d'armes à feu, on a entendu une grande explosion qui a mis un terme à la vie du couple Prats-Cuthbert.

Cet attentat a étés commandé para le Gouvernement du Chili d'Auguste Pinochet, et exécuté par l'agent de la CIA-DINA, Michael Vernon Townley. (Voir : L'agent ...

Informe de la Comisión Nacional Prisión Política y Tortura en Chile

2004-12-03T12:07:01Z

Consultar el en informe integral en el sitio de :

La Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura

La Marine admet ses actes de torture sous Pinochet

2004-12-02T07:07:43Z

El Correo, 2 décembre 2004

La Marine chilienne a admis pour la première fois, la participation d'officiers et subalternes à des pratiques de torture sous la dictature du général Augusto Pinochet.

Dans un communiqué, la marine a en outre qualifié de "véridiques" les témoignages contenus dans un rapport remis au président Ricardo Lagos et diffusé sur internet depuis dimanche soir. Le document a été écrit par une Commission spéciale ayant recueilli pendant plus d'un an les témoignages de 35.000 personnes torturées sous le régime militaire (1973-1990). Il y a quelques semaines, l'armée de terre avait reconnu aussi des actes de torture

La tentavive d'assasinat du Senateur des Etats Unis Edward Koch.

2004-10-13T00:00:00Z

Washington, D.C. -

Military officials of Uruguay, who were members of a secret Southern Cone intelligence alliance called Operation Condor, threatened to assassinate U.S. Congressman Edward Koch in mid-1976, according to a just published book, The Condor Years : How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents (The New Press 2004). Written by investigative journalist John Dinges, the book reveals that the CIA intercepted the threat but failed to take any actions in response to it or to warn Congressman Koch for more than two months.

In an interview for the book, Koch said that the then Director of Central Intelligence, George Herbert Walker Bush, informed him in October 1976 that his sponsorship of legislation to cut off U.S. military assistance to Uruguay on human rights grounds had provoked secret police officials to "put a contract out for you."

According to documents obtained by Dinges and interviews he conducted for The Condor Years, the CIA station chief in Montevideo received information in late July 1976 that two high-level Uruguayan intelligence officers had discussed their ability to have Chile's secret police, DINA, send agents to the United States to kill Koch. The station chief, identified in the book as Frederick Latrash, reported the conversation to CIA headquarters but recommended that the Agency take no action because the officers had been drinking at a cocktail party when the threat was made.

Only after Chilean operatives carried out the September 21, 1976, assassination of former ambassador Orlando Letelier did the CIA warn Koch and share the intelligence with the FBI and the State Department, according to the new book. A car bomb planted by those agents killed Letelier and an American woman, Ronni Moffitt on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington D.C. Considered at the time to be the most egregious act of international terrorism ever committed in the U.S. capital, the Letelier-Moffitt assassination was quickly linked by the FBI to a shadowy six-country alliance, Operation Condor, created by Chile to enable the military governments to track down and kill their opponents inside and outside of Latin America.

The basic Condor method of operation, according to FBI and CIA documents, was for member countries to assist each other in carrying out assassinations against each other's enemies. Col. Jose Fons, one of the two officers identified as discussing the plan to kill Koch, was Uruguay's representative to a November 1975 secret meeting in Santiago, Chile, at which Operation Condor was created, according to secret Chilean documents obtained by Dinges. The other officer, Major Jose Nino Gavazzo, who is described in a secret State Department memorandum as "apparently a dangerous type," was also a Condor operative. He headed a team of intelligence officers working in Argentina in 1976 in operations that resulted in the kidnapping and deaths of more than 100 Uruguayans.

In addition to the CIA intelligence about targeting Koch, Dinges has compiled more than 30 CIA, State Department and Pentagon documents discussing Operation Condor and coordination of assassinations among Chile, Argentina and Uruguay—all dated in the months leading up to the Letelier assassination. The US intelligence community, he concludes, had detailed and timely information on planned Condor terrorism, which officials obtained from their contacts inside the Latin American security forces. But they were loath to act on the information because of the friendly nature of their relationship with those agencies and because the U.S. government and the Latin American regimes shared the overall goal of defeating communism.

During a July 30, 1976, meeting between CIA and State Department officials, a CIA representative, for the first time, shared intelligence on Operation Condor, which he described as "organization [that] was emerging as one with a far more activist role, including specifically that of identifying, locating, and 'hitting' guerrilla leaders." The CIA official described these as "disturbing developments in [Condor's] operational attitudes."

In The Condor Years, Dinges concludes that had US officials acted on this intelligence, the Letelier assassination might well have been prevented. "When terrorist plots by our enemies are discovered the threat is greatly exaggerated and given major publicity," he said, drawing a parallel with the current debate over intelligence failures in Iraq. "But when terrorist plans by our allies are discovered, they are minimized and kept secret. That is what happened with the Condor information that could have prevented the Letelier assassination ; and that is what the CIA did with the information on the plot against Koch."

In mid October 1976, Koch wrote to the Justice Department asking for FBI protection and requesting "any additional information relating to this matter in your files…which I should be made aware of." None was provided to him. In his 1991 autobiography, Koch wrote that Bush had called him and told him to "be careful." But, until Dinges told the former mayor of New York City about Operation Condor in an interview in 2001, Koch was not aware of the connection between the threat on his life and the assassination operations of Condor, on which the CIA had concrete intelligence in the summer of 1976.

As a result of his meeting with Dinges, Koch petitioned the CIA and other agencies for more information on why he had not been expeditiously warned of a terrorist threat on his life. The CIA declined to declassify the relevant reports, but sent Koch a letter with this explanation for the delay : "The Agency's initial analysis of these comments [the military officers' discussion of killing Koch] was that they represented nothing more than alcohol-induced bravado. In the aftermath of the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC, U.S. officials questioned their assumption that other countries would not conduct assassinations in the U.S." (see Document 4)

Details of the threat have also been deleted from State and Justice Department documents released to Koch. But the documents reveal that the State Department took action after the fact to prevent the two officers from entering the United States. In late 1976, Colonel Fons and Major Gavazzo were assigned to prominent diplomatic posts in Washington D.C., but the State Department forced the Uruguayan government to withdraw their appointments with the public explanation that "Fons and Gavazzo could be the objects of unpleasant publicity…." The real reason, according to the documents, was the threat against Koch (see Document 3).

Read the Documents

Note : The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Koch-01

Document 1 : Koch letter to U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi : October 19, 1976
After receiving a phone call from an FBI agent who briefs him on the "possible danger" to his life, Koch writes to the Attorney General. He asks : "should my staff and I not have F.B.I. protection ?" He also requests that the Justice Department provide him with any additional information in their files, or the CIA files. Finally, he suggests that it would "be sensible to advise the Uruguayan government that it would be held responsible in the event of an assault upon me or my staff."

Koch-02

Document 2 : Edward Levi letter to Henry Kissinger, November 5, 1976
Two weeks after the Koch letter to Levi is sent, the Attorney General writes to Secretary of State Kissinger to suggest that the demarche Koch proposed to the Uruguayan military regime "appears to be a matter within your jurisdiction, and I therefore refer it to you for your attention…."

Koche-03

Document 3 : State Department SECRET Action Memorandum, "Uruguayan Threat Against Congressman Koch," December 13, 1976
This heavily censored memorandum to Philip Habib from Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Harry Shlaudeman reviews the death threat against Koch and poses "one additional problem" : that the Uruguayan officers who made the assassination threat are due to be appointed to high-level diplomatic posts in Washington D.C. U.S. Ambassador to Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, has urged the State Department to inform the Uruguayan government that "these two gentlemen would not be welcome in the United States." Shlaudeman recommends, and Habib approves, vetoing the appointment of Col. Jose Fons and Major Jose Gavazzo on the excuse that they would become objects of "unpleasant publicity" because of their involvement in human rights atrocities in Uruguay.

Koch-04

Document 4 : CIA Letter to Edward Koch, September 26, 2001
The CIA responds to a request from Koch (made after his interview with author John Dinges) for additional information in Agency files on the assassination threat against him. The Agency letter suggests that the CIA did not take the threat seriously at first because the officer making it was "reportedly in the state of intoxication." But, after the September 21, 1976, Washington D.C. car-bombing that killed Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt "U.S. officials questioned their assumption that other countries would not conduct assassinations in the U.S." The letter reveals that weeks after the threat was made, and one week after the carbombing, the CIA directorate of operations disseminated this intelligence to the FBI and State Department. The letter concludes with the CIA's refusal to declassify any actual documents on the Koch threat "because to do so would disclose the intelligence sources and methods by which the CIA obtained the above information."

Condor : L'agent Michael Vernon Townley

2004-10-12T06:10:59Z

Voici différents documents sur l'agent Michael Vernon Townley.

FBI Report on Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA)
21 January 1982

Chile 02, p.1
January 21, 1982

DIRECCION DE INTELIGENCIA NACIONAL
(DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE) (DINA)

Chili02-01

DINA was the name of the Chilean Intelligence Service until late 1977, when it was renamed the Centro Nacional de Informaciones (National Information Center) (CNI).
Former Assistant United States Attorney Eugene M. Propper, the chief prosecutor in the Orlando Letelier assassination case, and author Taylor Branch are collaborating in writing a book detailing the United States investigation of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States, who was killed on September 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C. Propper and Branch advised that during their research they secured a number of letters which were sent from the United States by self-admitted DINA agent, Michael Vernon Townley, to Gustavo Etchepare, his DINA/CNI "cut-out" in Chile. They made copies of these letters available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in September, 1981. In many instances the letters were extremely cryptic and Townley utilized code words and code names throughout. The subject matter of the letters, among other topics, covered DINA activities circa 1974-1976.

Set forth below is a topical summary of information in Townley's letters : Chile 02, p.2

TOPICAL SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Chili02-02

I. Disinformation Forwarded to Chile by Townley :
Throughout his letters, Townley furnished the recipients numerous items of disinformation which, for the most part, were self-serving. Townley obviously has attempted to minimize damage to his and his families interests as a result of information furnished by him to the U.S. Government concerning DINA operations. In some instances, it appears that Townley may have knowingly lied.

II. Transmittal of Documents to CNI by Townley :
In several letters, Townley made veiled references to unspecified documents, which he apparently removed from the U.S. Attorneys Office, Washington, D.C., and forwarded to Chile. Specific examples of such communications are an undated letter from Townley to Chilean President Pinochet and a letter to Gustavo Etchepare dated 6/24/78. Townley was interviewed at FBIHQ on 10/20/81 by SAs L. Carter Cornick, Jr., and Robert W. Scherrer and was specifically asked to identify the documents he removed from the U.S. Attorneys Office, Washington, D.C., and forwarded to CNI in Chile. Townley claimed he could not specifically recall which documents he forwarded to Chile ; however, he did admit that he forwarded the text of a declaration executed by U.S. Ambassador to Chile George W. Landau to CNI. Ambassador Landau's declaration was incorporated into the U.S. Government's extradition request to the Chilean Government for General Contreras, Colonel Espinosa and Captain Fernandez and became part of the public Chilean court record.

III. Visit of Virgilio Paz to Chile during 1976 :
In addition to information previously furnished by Townley during 1978 concerning Paz's visit to Chile, Townley, during interview on 10/20/81, advised that when Paz arrived in Chile in Spring of 1976 he brought with him a Colt .45 caliber automatic pistol, which was a special competition model. Townley advised that Paz claimed that this weapon had recently been used by the Cuban Nationalist Movement in a "hit" and that his purpose in bringing the weapon to Chile was to dispose of same. Townley advised that he witnessed Paz break the weapon into pieces with a sledge hammer and indicated that Paz subsequently disposed of the broken parts in Santiago. Townley claimed he had not furnished this information previously since he had completely forgotten the incident.

Chile 02, p.3

Chili02-03

IV. Withholding of Potential Evidence by Townley :
In a letter dated 11/24/78 to General Orozco in Chile, Townley claimed that during August, 1978, when his attorney, Seymour Glanzer, turned over to the U.S. Government officials in Washington, D.C., Townley's false U.S. passport in the name of Kenneth Enyart, which Townley's wife had brought from Chile to the United States along with other documentation, Townley was able to remove a second unidentified passport and avoid having it turned over to the U.S. Government as evidence.

V. Interception of Townley' Mail in Chile :
In several of his letters, Townley expressed concern that someone was intercepting his mail in Chile. Specific references in this regard are contained in Townley's letter to his wife dated 6/18/78 and in letters dated 3/17/79 and 6/29/79 to Gustavo Etchepare. In the latter communication, Townley informed Etchepare that his Chilean attorney, Manual Acuna, informed him that General Contreras was responsible for the interception of Townley's mail in Chile and that Contreras still had contacts in the Chilean Post Office who were in positions to continue intercepting Townley's mail. Townley's letters, which were intercepted by Contreras and subsequently utilized by him in the response to the U.S. Government's extradition requests, are identified below : 5/25/78 letter to his wife, 6/15/78 and 6/18/78 letters to Etchepare.

VI. Townley's Concern Regarding the Prosin Limited Checking Account at the Southeast First National Bank, Miami Florida :
The above account was maintained at the Southeast First National Bank by Townley in order to transact DINA business. In the following letters from Townley to his contacts in Chile, Townley expresses concern that the U.S. Government will uncover damaging information (not further specified) against him and DINA :

12/14/78 letter to Manual Acuna, his 6/29/79, 8/23/79, 9/7/79 and 9/10/79 letters to Gustavo Etchepare.

In his 12/14/78 letter to Acuna, Townley suggested that someone in Chile be officially named as an agent for Prosin Limited. Townley added "It would be best if this person appear one day and thereafter disappear forever." Townley's reason for the foregoing suggestion was not clear.

Chile 02, p.4

Chili02-04

In the other letters to Etchepare, listed above, Townley indicated that the Prosin Limited account would disclose checks reflecting payments to fugitive Virgilio Paz's wife. In addition, Townley also claimed that information contained in the Prosin Limited account might lead to the discovery of the whereabouts of fugitives Virgilio Paz and Jose Dionioso Suarez. Townley also expressed concern that information in the Prosin Limited account would lead to the discovery of details regarding "Project Andrea."

Records of the Prosin Limited account were subpoenaed through the U.S. Attorneys Office, Washington, D.C. in September, 1979. A thorough review of transactions in the account contained absolutely no information indicating payments to Paz's wife or any information that would assist in establishing the whereabouts of fugitives Paz and Suarez. The account contained no information related to "Project Andrea."

VII. Visit of Chilean President Pinochet to Spain During November, 1975, with General Contreras Where They Met with "ALFA," an Italian Terrorist :

According to former Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper and author Taylor Branch, ALFA is identical with an Italian terrorist whose true name is Stefano Delle Chiaie.

Townley made reference to ALFA, although he did not disclose his true identity, in the following communications to Gustavo Etchepare :

Letters dated 4/26/79, 6/11/79, 6/16/79, 8/23/79, 8/29/79 and 9/2/79.

In his 4/26/79 letter to Etchepare, Townley, speaking of General Contreras, stated " There were meetings between him (Contreras), his Excellency (President Pinochet) and the Italians in Spain after Franco died. Also the Italians carried out numerous acts of military espionage against the Peruvians and Argentines not only in Europe, but also in Peru and Argentina. "

In his 8/23/79 letter to Etchepare, Townley stated " I haven't spoken about the Italians. I have no idea where they are nor where they have been nor do I care to know ! ALFA got mixed up with various people to do business in Argentina. Some of them had very bad backgrounds whom Argentine law enforcement agencies were seeking. Among other

Chili02-05

things they tried to cash a check from Luis Felipe for $25,000, also they owed several thousand dollars including a $40,000 debt to Daniel, also he was mixed up in dirty deals in Spain.... "

" The problem with the Italians is serious, very serious ! Mamo got married to them some time back and he married them in a manner much more indissolvable than with the Cubans. For your information, Pinochet had a meeting with Mamo and ALFA in Spain some time back. ALFA can be much more embarrassing for Mamo and the government in the long run than perhaps the Cubans. One thing obviously is that ALFA doesn't have anywhere to go and you know that as well as I do. Ask Chico or Don Cristian who ran ALFA about it. "

Propper and Branch identified "Daniel" as Albert Spaggiari, a French master criminal who is a member of the OAS and also active in fascist activities in France. According to Propper and Branch, Spaggiari was arrested for the July, 1976, $10 million robbery of the Societe Generale Bank in Nice, France.

In Townley's 8/29/79 letter to Etchepare, Townley indicated that he was attaching a clipping from a local Denver, Colorado, area newspaper (the actual newspaper clipping was not attached to the copy of Townley's letter provided to the FBI by Propper and Branch). In his letter, Townley commented as follows : " I ask the question is it or is it not ? This is the style of Daniel.... " " I am very sorry about ALFA, whatever happened happened and the reasons which brought him problems. Sometime back he told me how much he wanted to get out of everything. He wanted to find himself an island or some other sanctuary without having to worry about his responsibilities toward his people. "

Propper and Branch made available a copy of an article which appeared in the 8/21/79 issue of the "Rocky Mountain News" captioned "Tunnel Builders 'Robbed' of Rich Haul in France," which they claimed was the article attached to Townley's 8/29/79 letter. The article described the arrest by French law enforcement authorities of a group of bank robbers who were tunneling into the Left Bank branch of the Societe Generale in France. The article compared this attempted bank robbery with the 1976 robbery of the Societe Generale branch in Nice, which was masterminded by Albert Spaggiari.
Townley made reference to "Daniel" in one additional communication, presumably to Etchepare, which was undated and bore the heading "SIGO CON COMPUTACION."
In this communication, Townley requested information as to what happened to "Daniel."

In another

Chili02-06

communication, Townley informed Etchepare that Enrique Arrancibia traveled from Buenos Aires, Argentina, to California during the Fall of 1977 on banking business for ALFA.
According to Propper and Branch, both ALFA and "Daniel" conducted operations on behalf of DINA.

VIII. Internal DINA Intrigues :
Based on the content of several of Townley's letters, it appears that CNI requested Townley and his wife to provide any derogatory information that could be used against General Contreras. Townley expressed his reluctance to provide such information and provided Etchepare with the identities of former DINA personnel who had detailed personal knowledge of irregularities and illegalities committed by Contreras and other DINA officials. In his 4/26/79 letter to Etchepare, Townley provided the following such individuals :

– Lima I

– Hermes

– Halcon

– Garza

– Claudio
In the above letter, Townley informed Etchepare that Colonel Valdivieso stole money from DINA accounts. Townley also informed Etchepare that Sonia, last name not mentioned, Valdivieso's DINA secretary, helped him to organize a network of secretaries within DINA who reported everything coming to their knowledge to Valdivieso. In the same communication to Etchepare, Townley also suggested that Valdivieso and Contreras were involved in extorting money from ITT in Chile, as well as the Racal Company in England in connection with contacts participated in by these companies for the purchase of equipment at the "Blogueo de Maipu."

IX. Townley's Concern Regarding the Assassination of Chilean Army General Carlos Prats and his Wife, Carmen, in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 9/30/74 and the Attempted Assassination of Former Chilean Vice President Bernardo Leighton and his Wife, Anita, in Rome, Italy, on 10/6/75 :
Retired Chilean Army General Carlos Prats Gonzalez and his wife, Carmen, were assassinated in Buenos Aires on 9/30/74, when a bomb was detonated underneath their car as they approached their residence. At the time of his assassination, General Prats had been critical of the Pinochet Government for interfering in the Chilean

Chile 02, p.7

Chili02-07

constitutional process and allegedly he was writing a book documenting his criticisms.
Former Chilean Vice President Bernardo Leighton and his wife, Anita, were shot several times in a downtown Rome street on 10/6/75, as they approached their residence on foot. Leighton is a prominent member of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party and at the time of his attempted assassination in 1975, was an outspoken critic of the Pinochet Government.

In numerous communications, which are listed below, Townley expressed concern that the "Italians" and the "Argentines" would submit Letters Rogatory seeking information from him concerning the Prats assassinations and the attempted assassination of the Leightons. Townley expressed fear that the "Italians," specifically ALPHA, and General Contreras would provide information concerning the attempted assassination of the Leightons which would contradict what Townley might say in responding to Letters Rogatory from the Italian Government, thereby placing Townley in the position of perjuring himself. Townley expressed similar concern that unidentified elements of one of the Argentine security services and Enrique Arrancibia would furnish information concerning the Prats assassination, which would contradict what Townley might say in responding to Letters Rogatory from the Argentine Government, thereby placing Townley in the position of perjuring himself. Townley concluded that the solution to his dilemma would be to take the Fifth Amendment in responding to Letters Rogatory from the Italian and Argentine Governments. However, Townley noted that by taking the Fifth Amendment, guilt on his part would be implied.

The letters in which Townley mentioned his concern over Letters Rogatory from the Italian and Argentine Governments concerning the Leighton and Prats matters are listed below :
Letters to Gustavo Etchepare dated 6/23/78, 11/25/78, 4/18/79, 4/26/79, 6/4/79, 6/16/79, 6/22/79, 7/5/79, 8/13/79 and 8/23/79. Letter to General Hector Orozco dated 11/24/78.
With regard to Enrique Arrancibia, this individual is a former DINA agent, who resided in unofficial exile in Buenos Aires as a result of his participation in the assassination of Chilean Army Chief of Staff, Rene Schneider. He was arrested by members of the Argentine Intelligence Service

Chile 02, p.8

Chili02-08

shortly after Townley's expulsion from Chile to the United States in 1978 and charged with espionage against the Argentine Government.

X. "Project Andrea"
Refer to FBI letter to the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), dated 12/9/81, and accompanying memorandum for complete details. Supplemental data follows.
In his letters, Townley suggested to Etchepare that the gas storage cylinders, which had been rented by DINA from a company in the United States, be purchased outright in order to avoid any additional problems involving the payment of rental charges to the company in the United States. Townley requested Etchepare to secure the serial numbers from the gas storage cylinders in Chile in order that the rental company in the United States might be provided this information, since the rental company had requested this data. Townley informed Etchepare that his father, J. Vernon Townley, should be provided with the serial numbers of the gas storage cylinders and that Townley's father, in turn, would provide this information to the rental company in the United States.
Townley mentions "Project Andrea" and matters related thereto in the following communications :
Letters to Gustavo Etchepare dated 4/26/79, 5/9/79, 5/29/79, 6/4/79, 6/29/79, 8/13/79 and 9/2/79.

XI. Activities of Virgilio Paz in Northern Ireland during 1975

In an undated letter to Chilean President Pinochet, Townley advised that photographs of British concentration camps in Northern Ireland were taken by Virgilio Paz as part of a DINA assignment.
According to Propper and Branch, the photographs taken by Paz in 1975 were to have been utilized by the Chilean Government at the United Nations in the United States in order to discredit the British Government for its alleged violation of human rights in Northern Ireland. Propper and Branch advised that the photographs taken by Paz arrived too late to be utilized by the Chilean Government at the United Nations and the photographs subsequently appeared in an article in "El Mercurio," a Spanish language daily newspaper published in Santiago, Chile.
Chile 02, p.9

Chili02-09

XII. Visit by Guillermo Novo Sampol to Chile in 1976

Based on information provided by Propper and Branch concerning an alleged planned kidnapping to be carried out in Buenos Aires, Argentina, during the Summer of 1976 in which the Cuban Nationalist Movement was to play a role, Townley was interviewed concerning this allegation on 10/20/81 by SAs Cornick and Scherrer. Townley previously furnished information during 1978 which indicated that Novo Sampol had visited Chile during the Summer of 1976 ; however, Townley stated that Novo's visit was not related to the Letelier assassination and did not involve a violation of United States law.

During interview with Townley on 10/20/81, he advised that Novo Sampol visited Santiago, Chile while Virgilio Paz was in Chile during June or July, 1976. Townley advised that Novo Sampol agreed to commit the Cuban Nationalist Movement to participate in the kidnapping of an unrecalled President of a Dutch bank in Buenos Aires, Argentina. According to Townley, civilian members of the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), one of the Argentine intelligence services, had developed the Dutch banker's secretary as a source and utilized information provided by her to make tentative plans to kidnap the Dutch banker and hold him for ransom. Townley explained that the Dutch banker and his secretary were having an affair and customarily spent several hours during weekday afternoons together at the same hotel, thereby assuring the civilian members of SIDE of a definite location from which the Dutch banker could be kidnapped. Townley reported that the SIDE civilian members believed it would be necessary to assassinate the Dutch banker's driver, who customarily waited for his employer at the hotel where the assignation customarily took place. Townley advised that Novo Sampol provided $6,000 from the Cuban Nationalist Movement, which was forwarded to the civilian members of SIDE in Argentina as the Cuban Nationalist Movement's share toward the operational expenses for the kidnapping operation. Townley stated that Novo Sampol, after returning to the United States, forwarded a stock of paper to Townley in Chile, which was utilized to print pamphlets in the name of "Grupo Rojo" (Red Group), a nonexistent Argentine Marxist terrorist organization which the civilian members of SIDE created in order to utilize this group to claim credit for the kidnapping of the Dutch banker. Townley advised that the "Grupo Rojo" pamphlets were printed in Chile and forwarded to the civilian members of SIDE in Argentina, where they were subsequently distributed in Mendoza and Cordoba

Chile 02, p.10

Chile02-10

in connection with bombings carried out by the SIDE civilian members. Townley noted that the purpose of utilizing the "Grupo Rojo" pamphlets in claiming credit for the bombings in Mendoza and Cordoba was to create the impression that the "Grupo Rojo" was a viable Marxist terrorist organization. Townley stated that Novo Sampol agreed to arrange for the pickup of the ransom for the Dutch banker in Europe and dispatched two unidentified Cuban Nationalist Movement members to establish necessary contacts in Europe to receive the ransom. Townley recalled that the ransom for the Dutch banker was to be paid in diamonds. Townley advised that the SIDE civilian members procrastinated in carrying out the kidnapping and indicated that the kidnapping never took place. Townley recalled that Novo Sampol traveled to Chile on a Braniff International Airways flight and returned to the United States via LAN-Chile. Townley advised that Novo Sampol utilized his true name to perform this travel ; however, Townley arranged that Novo Sampol's entry into Chile and his departure not be entered into the records of the Chilean International Police in order to avoid the existence of documentation of Novo Sampol's travel.

XIII. Interview with Michael Vernon Townley by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., on 10/20/81 :
During the interview with Townley by Special Agents of the FBI on 10/20/81 in Washington, D.C., Townley refused to provide any information concerning DINA operations, sources or methods that were mentioned in his letters, which were provided by Propper and Branch. Townley cited his agreement with the United States Government dated April 17, 1978, which required that he only furnish information to the United States Government relevant to violations of United States law or offenses committed in United States jurisdiction. Townley noted that he refused to answer any questions concerning DINA operations, sources or methods during the trial of the three Cuban defendants in the Letelier assassination, which took place in U.S. District Court, Washington, D.C., during early 1979, based on his agreement with the United States Government. Townley noted that his position was upheld by the presiding Judge and that he was not required to provide such information.

Chile 02, p.11

Chile02-11

INDEX

– El Gerente — CNI Director General Odlanier Mena.

– El Indio — CNI official Colonel Jeronimo Pantoja Henriquez.

– Garza — Former DINA agent Jose Fernandez Schilling.

– GAT — Grupo de Amigos de Townley (Code name for CNI financial support to Townley and his family).

– Caballero — Former DINA Director General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda.

– Andrea — Code word for Chilean Government's nerve gas project.

– Frank G. — Francisco (Frank) Gutay, U.S. citizen of Uruguayan origin. Owner of the American Business System Company in Georgia. He was an associate of Townley's in a computer company.

– Mamo — General Contreras.

– Tavo — Gustavo Etchepare.

– Gustavo — Gustavo Etchepare.

– Victor-Victor — Former DINA official Colonel Vaniel Valdivieso.

– Los Picas or El Pica — Attorneys.

– Contacto Regular — Term for Townley's DINA "cut-out" Gustavo Etchepare.

– Ximena or Jimena — Secretary of Townley's U.S. Attorney Seymour Glanzer.

– Roxana — Townley's former DINA Secretary Maria Rosa Alejandra Damiani Serrano.

– Walter — Damiani's boyfriend or husband.

– El Chico — Former DINA official Colonel Raul Iturriaga Neuman.

– Franco — Generalissimo Francisco Franco, former ruler of Spain who died in 1975.

– Sam — Townley's dog.

Chile 02, p.12

Chile02-12

- Luis Felipe — Former DINA Agent Enrique Arrancibia Clavel.

– Pato — Townley's son-in-law.

– Susie — Townley's step-daughter Susana Earnst.

– La Flaca — Etchepare's wife.

– ALFA — Italian terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie, aka Alfredo di Stefano.

– Daniel — Corsican terrorist and OAS member Albert Spaggiari.

– Esteban — Townley's DINA driver and aide.

– Hermes or H. — Eugenio Berrios, a chemical engineer who worked with Townley on Project
Andrea and was also engaged in a parallel project for the Chilean Army.

– Cuviches or Cubiches — Members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement.

– City of Martin — Buenos Aires, Argentina.

– Ches — Argentines.

– Los viudos — Letelier's widow Isabel Letelier and Ronni Moffitt's widower Michael Moffitt.

– mi viejo — Townley's father, J. Vernon Townley.

– El Servicio — DINA or CNI.

– El Fiscal — Former Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene M. Propper.

– Manuel or Manuel A. — Townley's Chilean Attorney Manuel Acuna.

– Javier — Virgilio Paz Romero.

– Pinocho — Chilean President Pinochet.

– Cacho Acevedo — Possibly identical to former DINA officer Captain Hugo Acevedo Godoy.

– Sonia — Secretary to Former DINA official Colonel Vaniel Valdivieso. Sonia apparently ran a network of secretaries within DINA and assisted Valdivieso in gathering data on other DINA officials.
Chile 02, p.13

Chile02-13

- Miranda C. — Sergio Miranda Carrington, General Contreras' attorney.

– la pelota del otro lado — Former Legat, Buenos Aires, Calvin C. Clegg.

– Fernando — Fernando Cruchaga, former LAN-Chile Station Manager, New York City.

– Los vecinos — The Argentine Government.

– Cafe rojo punto verde kilo or cafe rojo verde kilo (CR VK) — Secret support fund for the Townley family in Chile.

– Chris — Townley's son.

– Brian — Townley's son.

– Armando — Former DINA officer Captain Armando Fernandez Larios.

– Enrique A. — Former DINA agent Enrique Arrancibia Clavel.

– Weck — James Weck, an attorney and family friend of the Townleys.

– Pros. or Pro. — Prosin Limited bank account maintained by Townley at the Southeast First National Bank, Miami, Florida.

– Ken — Kenneth Enyart - alias of Townley.

– Andres W. — Andres Wilson - alias of Townley.

– Los Gringos — The Americans.

– Alfa echo — Alfredo Etcheberry, Chilean attorney representing U.S. Government in Chile.
The identity of the following individuals and the meaning of the following code names and code words were unknown to Propper and Branch and are being listed for reference purposes only.

– Canario — Identity unknown. Apparently involved in a computer business in Santiago, Chile at the University of Chile with Townley.
Chile 02, p.14

Chile02-14

- Gaviota — Identity unknown. Apparently involved in a computer business in Santiago, ChileattheUniversityofChilewithTownley.

– Lobo—Identityunknown.An apparent DINAagent who had contactwith Anital Lipthay,another DINA agent.

– Roberto Smith or Roberto S. — Identity unknown. Appears to be connected with CNI and telephonicallycontacted Townley's sister in Westchester County, New York during 1979.

– Honorato — Identity unknown. Possibly was a TV reporter.

– DAS — Identity unknown. Possibly was a DINA agent.

– Eugenio — A DINA agent who was a contact of ALFA.

– Freddy — Identity unknown. Was a DINA agent who apparently was aware of details of bank accounts maintained in the U.S. by General Contreras.

– Don Cristian — Identity unknown. Was the DINA control officer at DINA Headquarters who ran ALFA.

– LIMA I — Identity unknown. Was a DINA agent who was aware of irregularities in the operation of DINA committed by General Contreras.

– Elias — Identity unknown. May possibly have been a DINA agent. Apparently the investigation of Chilean Military Prosecutor Hector Orozco was damaging to his interests.
There are numerous other code names, code words and phrases in Townley's letters to which it was impossible to render any interpretation or meaning.
Back to home page

********************************

Le FBI et Townley :

DINA-EXTERN_PFBI2_0000061B